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ABSTRACT
In this study, Turkey’s reaction to the ousting of Mohammed Morsi 
in Egypt is studied in comparison with one regional and one global 
actor with a democratic regime. This study aimed to examine 
the dynamics of Turkey over-signalling negatively to the coup in 
comparison with Israeli and American reactions. In comparison with 
Turkey’s reaction, the US shyly signalled positively in statements and 
used financial means against the coup hesitantly. Israel pursued a 
‘strategic silence’ approach and eschewed signalling at all. It is seen 
that all three countries’ motivations were dominantly material, and no 
country reacted with purely normative motivations. The US and Turkey 
applied a selective normative approach according to their material 
motivations. While Turkey focused on the illegitimacy of the coup, 
the US focused on the illiberal policies of Morsi whereas Israel openly 
avoided adopting a normative approach.
Introduction
A ‘good coup’ label or a ‘bad coup’ label is not determined solely according to whether the 
coup was intended to push a society towards democracy or autocracy. Occasionally the 
international actors do not respond, either positively or negatively, to certain coups due to 
their lack of interest.1 Egypt is the most populous Arab country with significant influence 
in the Middle East and it possesses strategic assets, primarily the Suez Canal. Thus, the coup 
against Mohammed Morsi in Egypt on 3 July 2013 may not be neglected like others. Since 
the coup overthrew a democratically elected administration, the reactions against coup have 
a normative aspect but the international actors did not automatically label the coup as ‘bad 
coup’. Indeed, Egypt pushed actors like the United States (US) and the European Union 
(EU), as champions of democracy, to make hard choices, primarily in the labelling of the 
incident as a coup or not. Conversely, Turkey positioned itself as in strong opposition to the 
coup in Egypt and was, in fact, one of the most vocal countries against the coup. Not only 
in terms of statements, but also in actions, Turkey pushed hard for a reversal of the coup 
in Egypt. This approach by Turkey is unprecedented, yet its differentiation from the other 
actors is salient as well. In order to make better sense of Turkey’s reaction, a comparative 
case analysis with two other democratic states seems necessary. In this article, the reactions 
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of Turkey to the July 2013 coup in Egypt, in comparison with the US as a global actor and 
Israel as a regional democratic actor, will be examined based on motivations and signalling. 
In order to more effectively study the responses of these three countries, the framework of 
Shannon et al. in their article titled ‘The international community’s reaction to coups’, one 
of the rare studies on the matter, will be applied in terms of these three states’ reactions to 
the Egypt coup in order to evaluate the material and normative motivations and the way 
they signalled in response to the coup.
External reactions to coups d’état
Reaction motivations of states
Foreign responses to military coups originate from two types of motivations: the norma-
tive and the material.2 The normative motivation refers to protection of democracy against 
authoritarianism due to its normative value. Especially in the twentieth century, because of 
the increasing number of democratically ruled countries, democracy became a ‘universal 
value’ voiced louder than ever before.3 The second wave of democratization after the Second 
World War, and the third wave after the collapse of the Soviet Union, solidified this trend.4 
Thus, ‘democracy as an international norm is stronger today than ever’ and that protecting 
and supporting democracy is becoming acknowledged by states as one of the foreign pol-
icy goals.5 Material motivations, on the other hand, are about economic and/or strategic 
security issues. The economic interests at stake may relate to trade agreements, oil supply, 
and major company investments in the country concerned.6 The strategic security interests 
may involve the alliance relations at stake or military base and facility usage agreements. 
Thus, the countries react to coups d’état in order to protect their economic or strategic 
interests. The normative and material interests may motivate the states to respond to coups 
d’état either positively or negatively. According to the interests at stake, the states may react 
strongly or keep a low profile.
Positive or negative signalling
The foreign actors’ positive or negative reactions to the coups ‘have meaningful influences 
on the country’s post-coup political trajectory’.7 Since the post-coup leaders seek legitimacy, 
they need international support along with domestic blessing. Positive signals given by other 
states ease the transition process and help the coup leaders establish their authority. Negative 
signals, on the other hand, challenge the legitimacy of the new authority and encourage the 
domestic opposition to react against them. Indeed, even moderately negative reactions from 
an outside country decrease the lifetime of a coup-born regime and shorten their ‘leader 
duration’ significantly. 8 In terms of reactions, the statements of high-level officials and 
direct actions of states are called signals.9 Signals enable the observers to deduce positive 
or negative responses. The normative and material motivations and capacity to influence 
the post-coup regime determine the states’ decisions on signalling. In response to a new 
regime, states may decide to signal hostilely, positively and supportively, or avoid signalling 
at all. The minimum negative reaction to a coup d’état is denunciation of the illegal action 
and a call for the restoration of the former regime.10 In normative means, in order to protect 
democracy as a value, a quick and unequivocal public condemnation of the coup would be 
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necessary. The presence of a strong condemnation of coups against democratically elected 
governments would change the calculations of future coup attempts.11
Negative signalling is not limited to public statements by state officials or political leaders. 
It may include economic and financial sanctions as well as sanctions targeting key individu-
als, using tactics such as visa restrictions and asset freezing.12 The effectiveness of economic 
sanctions is questioned, but such targeted sanctions are influential in the destabilization 
of targeted coup governments.13 For example, in response to the coup in Fiji in 2000, the 
Australian government implemented a trade boycott and employed a travel ban on coup 
leader George Speight that blocked his ability to contact his family.14 Fiji’s experience in 
2000 suggests possible success in using economic sanctions to restore democracy. The last 
resort when responding to a military coup is the use of force on behalf of the overthrown 
government. This response is the strongest that a country may decide to employ individually 
or within a collective international body. The US reaction to the coup in Haiti in 1991 is an 
important example. The US, under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 
mandate, made a successful military intervention to restore the former leadership with a 
coalition of countries.15 Foreign states may also give supportive signals after a coup. Similar 
to negative signals, first, the state officials or political leaders may make public statements 
that either directly or indirectly legitimize the coup. For instance, the US supported the 2002 
coup attempt against Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. The American administration avoided 
using the term ‘coup’ and, instead, deemed Chavez and his undemocratic practices blame-
worthy in regard to the developments.16
Statements that endorse the reasons behind the coup, or directly support the coup as 
a whole, increase the legitimacy of the post-coup regime. Beyond statements of support, 
countries often provide economic aid to the state after the coup. They may offer weapons 
as well as an increasing supply of other necessary goods. For instance, in exchange for 
its cooperation with the US to combat terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistani coup-leader 
Pervez Musharraf received $10 billion in financial and military aid until 2007 and the Bush 
administration committed to technology sharing and sales of F-16s.17 Using the framework 
provided above, the material and normative motivations will be examined within the states’ 
responses in statements and symbolic actions regarding the legitimacy of the post-coup 
regime along with diplomatic, economic and financial measures when applicable.
Road to coup d’état in Egypt
After the ousting of Hosni Mubarak during the Arab uprisings, the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power with the promise to carry authority to elected civilian 
leaders. SCAF could not meet the expectations of the Egyptians, and their mistakes caused 
them to lose credibility. They not only continued to push for police suppression to stop the 
protests but they also could not bring any change to the dire economic conditions, and 
this caused public calls for a civilian administration.18 As promised, the parliamentary and 
presidential elections were held and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), with a strong, organ-
ized network throughout the country, did not have a real competitor.19 Thus, its Freedom 
and Justice Party (FJP) won 42 per cent of the votes in the Lower House, 58 per cent of the 
votes in the Upper House and finally 52 per cent of the votes in the presidential elections 
on 16–17 June 2012.20 The MB’s candidate, Mohammed Morsi, was elected President. In the 
meantime, SCAF increased its power with seven major amendments in the constitution that 
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‘subordinated the president to military command’, primarily via the authority of legislation 
and immunity from civilian oversight.21 One month later, SCAF members were replaced 
by a young generation of officers led by General Abd-el Fettah el-Sisi.
The new administration brought some changes to Egypt’s foreign affairs but did not 
cause a major drift. The Morsi administration drew closer to Turkey and gave signals to 
balance Iran in Iraq and Syria along with Turkey.22 Morsi ‘demonstrated more independence 
from the United States and Israel but maintained the peace treaty and sought to reassure 
foreign powers about continuity in core policy areas’.23 The US administration welcomed 
their readiness to cooperate and decided to engage and invest in the MB both before and 
after the elections.24 However, after attacks on the US Embassies in Benghazi and Cairo 
on 11 September 2012, US President Barack Obama used a strong tone towards Egypt and 
stated: ‘I don’t think that we would consider them an ally.’25 In domestic matters, the military 
managed to preserve its place and power in the Egyptian political and economic systems.26 
Despite the dominance of the Egyptian military, President Morsi failed to form pacts with 
the secular and liberal groups within Egypt. His attempt to consolidate his position in a 
very short time, along with the new constitution and increasing number of Brotherhood 
members in state institutions, gave the impression of a power grab.27 Morsi was inexperi-
enced at running a country and the political landscape was not providing chances to bring 
reforms. He could not deliver the expected economic changes in such a short time, and 
the everyday life of Egyptians was not improved.28 These problems brought public protests 
against Morsi and provided means for the military to intervene.
On 1 July 2013, el-Sisi gave an ultimatum to the government that asked for the ‘fulfilment 
of people’s demands’ in 48 hours and asserted that otherwise the military would declare a 
roadmap for politics in Egypt.29 In response to the army’s appeal Morsi rejected resignation 
and the call for elections, and denounced the Egyptian Army for making statements with-
out consulting him.30 On 3 July 2013 the Egyptian army, under the leadership of General 
el-Sisi, declared the disbanding of the government and suspension of the constitution. In 
reaction to these developments, MB supporters went onto the streets for peaceful public 
protests. Nonetheless, the Morsi supporters at Rabaa al-Adawiyye Square were raided by 
the security forces and more than 1300 people were killed and nearly 3500 MB members 
were arrested.31 The judge recommended that 683 MB members be sentenced to death. 
Among those, the courts confirmed the death sentence for 183 members.32 One year later, 
in the presidential elections that took place on 26–28 May 2014, el-Sisi was elected as the 
new president of Egypt.
Turkey’s reaction to the coup: over-signalling for a lost bet
Turkey had both material motivations in terms of losing a key ally in the region and nor-
mative motivations in its strong negative reaction to the coup d’état in Egypt. The country’s 
signalling was packaged mainly within the framework of the normative approach that 
focused on the ballot box in terms of democracy and illegitimacy of a military overthrow. 
The Turkish government signalled negatively to the coup regime in exhaustive ways, includ-
ing statements, diplomatic means, financial measures, protests and conferences.
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Material and normative motivations
The strategic loss for Turkey caused by the coup was one of the motivations behind Turkey’s 
actions, as the country had been seeking ways to increase its influence in the Middle East. 
The leadership in Turkey was looking to the revolution in 2011 as a major opportunity to 
do just that. Indeed, the architect of Turkish Foreign Policy, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, considered the uprisings a chance for Turkey to show its ‘potential to 
contribute [to] the transformation of the international system’.33 Having a similar ideolog-
ical background to the ruling Justice and Development Party, Turkish leaders regarded the 
MB rule in Egypt as an opportunity. Along with this perspective, the Turkish government 
focused on the MB in relation to Egypt to the extent that it caused criticisms and alienation 
of the other political groups.34 The Turkish government had a new vision for the Middle 
East, and Egypt under Mohammed Morsi’s rule was regarded as ‘key ally’.35 Along with this 
vision, there was an attempt to develop a common approach on the Syrian crisis and the 
Mediterranean strategy, and to move together on the Palestinian–Israeli dispute.36
As a result, Turkey invested both politically and economically in the MB ruling Egypt 
before the coup. Turkey dispatched US$2 billion as a direct loan and also provided training 
to counterparts on policing and party politics.37 Moreover, Turkey established the High-
Level Strategic Cooperation Council with Egypt and conducted military exercises in Turkish 
territorial waters in the Eastern Mediterranean.38 Turkey also increased its high-level visits 
to Cairo and signed 28 agreements with Egypt.39 However, the coup d’état stifled all of efforts 
to develop a ‘strategic partnership’ between Turkey and Egypt40 with a common identity of 
two ruling parties based on political Islam.
Turkey’s focus on the MB backfired not only in losing all these political investments but 
also because of concerns caused by the coup’s reflections on Turkey. These concerns related 
to the position of the ruling party vis-à-vis the military in Turkey and a possible triggering 
effect of the Egyptian coup in Turkey. Since the overthrow of Morsi was realized in tandem 
with the public protests, the Gezi protests in Turkey increased the concerns of the ruling 
party. 41 As a reaction, the ruling party in Turkey took an offensive stance against the coup 
in Egypt. There are also claims that the ruling party might use the Egyptian coup as a way 
to delegitimize the Gezi movement and Turkish opposition42 as well as to commercialize 
the ‘victimhood of the Muslim Brotherhood’ to rally its supporters.43
The economic issues, compared with the strategic and political concerns, did not play 
as strong a role in motivating Turkey’s responses. It is true that the trade volume between 
Turkey and Egypt increased threefold after the 2011 revolution and reached US$5 billion 
in 2012. Further, there were nearly 300 Turkish investors with a US$2 billion investment 
before the coup in Egypt.44 After the coup, the new administration declared that some trade 
agreements would not be renewed,45 but the el-Sisi administration did not bring major 
disruption to trade with Turkey. The Turkish administration was not expecting a significant 
economic loss or negative effect on Turkish investments.46 Thus, Turkey’s reaction to the 
coup in Egypt did not primarily stem from its economic motivations.
Turkey had normative motivations in reacting to the removal of the Morsi government by 
the Egyptian military. The Turkish government was supporting the demands of the people 
in Arab streets and gave importance to the ballot box. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey 
had an honourable position that favoured the masses against their authoritarian regime 
and sided with ‘the leaders elected by the people’.47 Nonetheless, some critiques highlighted 
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the fact that the Turkish government was non-responsive to the Gezi Park protests and 
the protests in Egypt against Morsi’s rule based on demands for ‘pluralistic political order 
with unambiguous recognition and respect for diversity’.48 Thus, it seems that the Turkish 
government had a normative motivation in terms of its minimal definition of democracy 
as free and fair elections, rather than a broader conceptualization with accountability and 
pluralism to achieve liberal democracy.49
Over-signalling hostile
Turkey gave strong negative signals to the post-coup military administration after the 
removal of Morsi. In terms of statements, Turkish high-level officials, primarily Prime 
Minister (PM) Tayyip Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
reacted negatively to the coup. Erdoğan’s statement implies both the context and very 
meaning of the Turkish normative approach. He asserted that:
Egypt should read the recent history of Turkey…. Without exception every coup made in 
Turkey caused it to lose decades…. Unequivocally coups are bad and in the end coup makers 
are not remembered with respect … in the end they [are] brought before the court even in 
their old age…. There is no rule other than the ballot box in democracy. And insulting the 
majority, insulting the preferences of the majority is also an attempt to destroy democracy.50
MFA Davutoğlu also stated that ‘the governments elected by [the] public should go with 
only the public decision, their overthrow by coup d’état is unacceptable’.51 Thus, the Turkish 
government condemned the coup immediately and unequivocally. The Turkish adminis-
tration also denounced both the domestic institutions of Egypt and international actors 
that gave support to the coup or avoided condemning it. The Turkish PM criticized the 
Egyptian military and the Sheik of el-Ezher University due to their support of el-Sisi; yet, 
these criticisms backfired and caused poor reactions among the Egyptians.52 PM Erdoğan 
also called for western countries to react to the coup and for Egyptian security forces’ vio-
lent crackdown on Morsi supporters, and asked the UNSC to convene immediately on the 
matter.53 The Turkish government also pushed international organizations diplomatically 
to react to the coup in Egypt. The EU and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
were called to react and Turkey denounced both organizations when they did not respond 
positively to the call.54
The Turkish government employed diplomatic measures and financial sanctions as well. 
It recalled the Turkish Ambassador to Cairo, Hüseyin Avni Botsalı, for consultations.55 In 
financial terms, Turkey stopped the aid given to Egypt.56 Later, the Secretary General of 
OIC, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, was also accused of not raising his voice enough against the 
coup, and the Turkish government called on him to resign his post as a reaction to the 
organization’s passivity.57 In Turkey, there were also protests and several international con-
ferences were arranged that supported the Morsi administration and denounced the coup 
regime. Primarily, the ruling party’s youth organization was active in protests against the 
coup in Egypt. Concerning the conferences, the first round was held in Istanbul on 10 July 
2013 with the participation of MB members; the second round of conferences was held in 
Istanbul and Lahore on 28 September 2013. The second round of conferences discussed 
topics regarding the coup in Egypt and international responses to it.58
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Preserve good relations with those running Egypt: US shy positive signalling to 
coup in Egypt
The US had both material and normative motivations in its reaction to the coup d’état in 
Egypt. The material motivations suggested that the US should remain silent or even support 
the coup; however, the normative motivations pushed for the denouncement of the military 
overthrow of the government and the illiberal policies pursued by Morsi. In contrast to the 
Turkish approach, the US focused more on the illiberal policies of Morsi rather than the 
illegitimacy of the military overthrow. The US administration was divided—it tried to strike 
a balance by releasing neutral statements from the White House and positive signalling 
from the State Department.
Material and normative motivations
The US administration often regarded Egypt as ‘too important to be strongly pressured’.59 
The main reason behind this premise is that certain strategic issues have been addressed 
only with the cooperation of the ruling actors in Egypt. These issues may be itemized: 
continuation of Egyptian–Israeli peace, over-flight rights and access to the Suez Canal, and 
cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts.60 Egypt has also been a recipient of American aid 
for more than three decades, which could be regarded as a long-term investment for the 
US.61 Nonetheless, Egypt had alternatives to the aid provided by the US: Russian President 
Putin offered possible arms sale as a substitute for US supplies.62 Thus, strategic motivations 
for the American administration suggested a positive response to the coup.
The US also had security concerns, especially after the attacks to the American embassies 
in Cairo and Benghazi on 11 September 2012. These attacks, especially that in Benghazi, 
increased the security concerns since the attack resulted in the death of four embassy per-
sonnel, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens.63 The attacks were also regarded as a 
harbinger of the increasing potential of extremist terrorism in the region.64 Along with the 
attack, the assessment of Arab uprisings shifted from a democracy-based approach to more 
of a security-based one, and concerns regarding the threat of militant Islamism increased.65 
Indeed, the US had long faced the dilemma of material and normative motivations in Egypt, 
since it had to decide between authoritarianism and religious extremism.66 In this dilemma, 
the US approach was first to secure its strategic concerns by preserving good relations with 
whoever was running Egypt.67 Thus, under the condition of meeting strategic concerns, 
the possibility of having a democratic regime as a counterpart is welcomed. Nonetheless, 
the US administration was not in a position to pressurise any ruling actor in Egypt for the 
sake of democratic norms because of the concern of losing leverage. This approach may be 
generalized to US policy after the ousting of Mubarak. The US administration did not react 
strongly to the SCAF on the issues of foray within the promotion of democracy, NGOs, and 
incarceration of their personnel.68 The US administration welcomed free and fair elections 
in Egypt, but did not put pressure on Morsi in reaction to his restrictions on the media and 
failure to bring about an inclusive constitution.69
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Hesitant positive signalling 
In the US response to the coup, a positive tone was more dominant. In terms of statements, 
US President Barack Obama declared on 3 July 2013 that ‘the United States does not support 
particular individuals or political parties but [is] … committed to a democratic process’, 
and he called the Egyptian military ‘to move quickly and responsibly to return full authority 
back to a democratically elected civilian government’.70 Along with this statement, Obama 
alluded to Morsi’s presidency not being truly democratic and Obama did not directly refer 
to the restoration of Morsi’s presidency. Obama also did not mention the illegitimacy of 
the coup. In contrast, Secretary of State John Kerry’s statements were more supportive of 
the coup regime. Kerry announced US support for ‘Egypt’s transition to democracy’ and 
referred to his statement in March 2013, before the coup, as evidence of continuity in the 
US position.71 Both his wording and his reiteration of the position in March suggest indif-
ference to the military coup as a negative development. Deputy Secretary of State William 
Burns was even clearer—he suggested the coup provided ‘another opportunity’ and ‘chance’ 
to correct the mistakes of the past two years.72
The US administration refrained from using the term ‘coup’ to address the developments 
in Egypt and el-Sisi utilized this approach by the US to establish greater legitimacy. It is 
claimed that this avoidance was related to the status of the US aid given to Egypt. The US 
code bans provision of assistance to governments with elected leaders who are overthrown 
by a coup d’état.73 By refraining from use of the term ‘coup’, the US administration also 
avoided cutting the aid given to Egypt after the coup. There are claims that the US avoided 
losing its leverage on the generals by keeping the flow of aid.74 Yet, Hamid and Mandaville 
suggested that US leverage over the post-coup leaders is not limited by foreign aid and that 
the decision to continue the aid is not due to ‘a lack of leverage, but [because of] absence 
of political will to use it’.75 After the coup, both Arab and Israeli lobbies worked hard in 
Washington to prevent aid cuts.76 Significantly, the Saudis provided an unconditional US$12 
billion financial aid to Egypt and pledged to substitute the US aid with a direct loan if it was 
suspended.77 The US delays in the delivery of F-16s, cancelling the military exercise, and, in 
the end, partially blocking US aid were only hindering the Egyptian military from stopping 
bloodshed. Indeed, these actions were far from convincing el-Sisi.78 Later, Secretary Kerry’s 
visit to Egypt and assurance to his Egyptian counterparts that the ‘aid issue is a small issue’ 
stifled the US leverage over el-Sisi.79 Nearly one year later, the US resumed partially frozen 
military aid to Egypt and proceeded with the delivery of Apache helicopters.80
Israeli reaction to the coup: strategic concerns and strategic silence
The material motivations were quite strong, if not existential, in the Israeli response to the 
coup in Egypt. In contrast to Turkey, the coup was strongly in favour of Israel’s interests 
and the Israeli decision-makers deliberately avoided a normative approach. Since strategic 
calculations indicated that silence would best serve Israeli interests, Israel avoided openly 
signalling positively or negatively, despite offering support through private back channels.
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Material and normative motivations
The Israeli administration was concerned that the Islamists winning the election would 
lead to the hijacking of Egypt and the establishment of an Islamist authoritarian system 
that can be summarized in the ‘one vote, one man, one time’ framework.81 In this vein, 
Israel regarded its European and American counterparts as ‘naive’ at best in their opti-
mistic expectations for Arab uprisings to bring more plural and democratic outcomes.82 
Despite the western tendency to regard these developments as parallel to ‘Europe 1989’, Israel 
regarded them as ‘Tehran 1979’.83 The Israeli administration did not see the social unrest as 
ordinary people seeking democracy; instead, it saw Islamists seeking power. According to 
the Israeli authorities, the MB and Morsi ‘were no paragons of democracy’ and democracy 
could not be achieved without democrats.84 Thus, Israel avoided the normative approach. 
Israel’s main concerns about the MB coming to power were related to the issues of the 
Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty, relations with Hamas and security in the Sinai Peninsula.85 The 
military coup in July 2013 not only ended these concerns but also changed the balance in 
favour of Israel on these issues.
In terms of the peace treaty, Israel had concerns about its annulment, or at least opening 
it for renegotiation.86 There were even concerns that, either with the influence of its revo-
lutionary change or its transition to democracy, Egypt might declare war against Israel.87 
Despite the limited possibility of such outcomes, the Israeli concerns were not totally delu-
sional. According to a Pew Research Center polling report published on 25 April 2011, 54 
per cent of Egyptians were in favour of annulment of the peace treaty in comparison with 
only 36 per cent favouring its continuity.88 Thus, the Israeli leadership did not want to deal 
with the Egyptian public because they were expecting any dealings would be in ‘Palestinian 
coin’.89 The coup in Egypt ended all Israel’s concerns and assured it of the future of the peace 
treaty once el-Sisi honoured it publicly.90
Another security concern was the position of Hamas after the MB came to power in 
Egypt. Since Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the MB, an affinity with the new Egyptian 
government increased the concerns of Israel. The Israeli administration was anxious about 
the possibility of Egypt opening the Rafah border and officially recognizing Hamas.91 On 
the contrary, Morsi avoided openly supporting Hamas, and even put pressure on Hamas 
politically and economically.92 Nevertheless, even a ceasefire brokered by Morsi did not put 
an end to Israeli concerns. After the overthrow of Morsi, Egypt’s position was fundamen-
tally changed on Hamas. The military regime regarded Hamas as an offshoot of the MB, 
which it declared to be a terrorist organization. Thus, it cut the flow of materials through 
the Rafah border and tunnels and endorsed Palestinian Authority as the true representa-
tive of Palestine.93 There are even claims that Egypt is becoming tougher on Hamas than 
Israel, which concerned the Israeli side regarding Egypt’s mediation role between Israel 
and Palestine.94
Israel’s final concern was about the security of the Sinai Peninsula. The terrorist activities 
in Sinai were a major concern to Israel and the revolution caused fears that the Egyptian 
government would turn a blind eye or avoid cooperating with Israel to combat terrorism. 
There were even fears of Sinai’s ‘Somalization’ along with concerns about naval security.95 The 
Morsi administration pursued a policy not very different from that of Mubarak, yet Morsi 
did not have strong control over the security forces on the ground. This problem also ended 
for Israel after the coup. In short, the strategic and security concerns of Israel regarding the 
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peace deal, Hamas and Sinai increased with the MB rule, but these concerns were met with 
the ousting of Morsi and new leadership after the coup, which even went beyond Israeli 
expectations. Thus, Israel had strong material motivations to support the coup in Egypt.
‘Strategic silence’ avoiding signalling
Because of Israel’s support and opposition, any matter in the Middle East can be quite 
controversial, so the Israeli authorities decided to remain silent on the coup. Despite the 
signals in favour of and against the coup in the region, Israel avoided making any com-
ments.96 According to the Director of the Center for the Study of the Middle East and Islam, 
Mordechai Kedar: 
You can do things, but do them under the water. Israel, by supporting explicitly the army, 
exposes itself to retaliation. Israel should have done things behind the scenes, under the surface, 
without being associated with any side of the Egyptian problem.97
Thus, along with the ‘strategic silence’ policy, Israeli officials did not publicly declare their 
preferences or support of any party in the developments in order to avoid accusations of 
interference.98 Nonetheless, avoiding making much noise, Israel diplomatically declared an 
offence in its allies’ capitals to gain support for the Egyptian military after the coup.99 Thus, 
in action, Israel gave diplomatic support to the coup in Egypt and pursued active lobbying, 
primarily in Washington.
Conclusion
In examining Turkey, the United States and Israel’s reactions to the ousting of Mohamed 
Morsi in Egypt, we see that all three countries’ motivations were dominantly material, 
and no country reacted with pure, normative motivations. They reacted in line with their 
strategic, security and economic motivations. Indeed their normative approaches were in 
line with their material approaches. Thus, the US and Turkey applied a selective normative 
approach according to their material motivations. While Turkey focused on the illegiti-
macy of the coup, the US focused on the illiberal policies of Morsi after the coup. Israel 
openly avoided a normative approach. The influence of the reactions is not related to the 
frequency of signalling, rather it is related to the level of global/domestic influence on the 
target country. Turkey’s response, despite over-signalling negatively to the coup, was not as 
influential as the US’s shyly positive signalling. Because of this, Saudis and Israelis lobbied 
for influence in Washington. Additionally, refraining from signalling in response to a coup 
does not always indicate indifference and lack of interest. The coup in Egypt was regarded 
as existential for Israel and avoiding signalling was part of its strategic calculation. These 
findings indicate that either the decision-makers in Turkey could not calculate their influ-
ence over the course in comparison with others, or that Turkey’s noisy reaction to the coup 
was aimed at a domestic, regional or international audience instead of aiming to have real 
influence on the ground.
Upon examination, three democratic countries took the coup in Egypt seriously: Turkey, 
the US and Israel. Among these, Turkey considered its material interests to be at stake with 
the coup; on the other hand, Israel regarded the coup as a saviour of its security and strategic 
concerns. For the US, the coup was neither a total loss nor a total win as it was for Israel 
and Turkey, but the US was able to ascertain its material interests. As a result of the coup, 
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the Turkish government lost a possible strong ally for regional cooperation in the future. 
Further, the Turkish government faced the risk of the developments triggering a similar 
course at home. Israel not only left behind its concerns about an Islamist administration in 
Egypt disrupting the peace treaty, helping Hamas and avoiding cooperation on Sinai, but 
Israel also reached stronger cooperation on these matters with the new administration. The 
US was assured of its material interests with regard to Egypt and Israel’s peace and security 
cooperation against the rise of violent extremism by having a more stable counterpart in 
Egypt. In terms of normative motivations, Turkey focused on the illegitimacy of a coup, 
whereas the US focused on the illiberal policies of Morsi in line with its material motiva-
tions. Israel had no normative approach. Along with these dynamics, Turkey reacted and 
signalled negatively to the coup and used statements and symbolic actions to delegitimize 
the coup. Turkey also used diplomatic channels and financial tools in opposition. The US 
shyly signalled positively and hesitantly used financial tools. Israel avoided signalling at all, 
but supported the coup quietly. Thus, refraining from signalling in response to a coup does 
not always indicate indifference and lack of interest. This finding requires further research, 
and also has implications regarding Turkey’s approach. The influence of Turkey was limited 
despite its exhaustive negative signalling. Thus, Turkey either could not calculate its impact 
on the matter or, rather than impacting on the ground, it played just for the audience.
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